Ernst B. Haas (University of California–Berkeley), an immigrant born in Frankfurt, was among the U.S. social scientists applying behavioral methods to international relations in the 1950s. In 1958 he published a book entitled *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* in which he used the European Coal and Steel Community as a case study in an attempt to dissect the “actual integration process” . . . to derive propositions about its nature.” Haas recognized that functional integration was taking place in Europe, but that functionalism as a theory had failed to explain why decision-makers chose to integrate in some areas and not others. Functionalism needed a theory of politics, which Haas provided.

Haas first defined political integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” Then he drew on democratic theory, systems theory, group theory, and a host of other approaches to produce a scientifically rigorous explanation for European political integration that he also believed held predictive power. This neo-functionalist approach (here introduced by Haas in the preface to *The Uniting of Europe* and described in greater detail by Leon Lindberg in Chapter 16) views the integration process as group driven. Federal institutions are established because important political groups see tangible benefits from joint governance in specific areas. The integration process pushes forward when federal institutions affect the interests of groups
that respond by organizing across national boundaries and pushing for more integration. Thus integration in one area spills over into another when groups perceive it in their interest.

Haas wrote prolifically on integration in the 1960s and early 1970s as the acknowledged leader of the neofunctionalist school. Neofunctionalism, while no longer as dominant as it was in the 1960s, is still very influential. And Ernst Haas is still widely read.

“United Europe” is a phrase meaning many things to many men. To some it implies the creation of a full-fledged federation of the independent states of Western Europe, either the Six of “Schumania” or the Fifteen of the Council of Europe. To others the phrase means no more than the desirability of creating a loose concert or confederation. Some see in it the guarantee for future greatness, a political, economic and cultural renaissance for the Old Continent, about to be eclipsed by the United States, the Soviet world, and perhaps the Arab-Asians. But others identify it with the death of cherished patterns of national uniqueness. Even government policy, on both sides of the Atlantic, sometimes hesitates between endorsing the creation of a new center of economic and political power and fearing the evolution of a high-tariff region or of institutionalized “third force” sentiments. One must add the still lively controversy over whether economic or military unification, or both, is possible without prior or simultaneous political federation. The arguments over the merits and types of unification have continued since the end of World War II; they are unlikely to be exhausted soon.

But for the political scientist the unification of Europe has a peculiar attraction quite irrespective of merits and types. He may see in it, as I do, an instance of voluntary “integration” taking place before his eyes, as it were under laboratory conditions. He will wish to study it primarily because it is one of the very few current situations in which the decomposition of old nations can be systematically analyzed within the framework of the evolution of a larger polity—a polity destined, perhaps, to develop into a nation of its own. Hence, my purpose is not the evaluation of the virtues and drawbacks of a United Europe in terms of European, American, national, international, free-enterprise, or welfare-state values. Nor is it an analysis of the advantages of federation over intergovernmental cooperation, economic over military unity. My aim is merely the dissection of the actual “integration process” in order to derive propositions about its nature. Hence, I focused my analysis on selected groups, institutions and ideologies which have already been demonstrated to act as unifying agents in political systems clearly “integrated” by any applicable standard. Further, I confined the analysis to the impact of the one organization whose powers, functions and composition make it a priori capable of redirecting the loyalties and expectations of political actors: the European Coal and Steel Community. My study, then, attempts to advance generalizations about the processes by which political communities are formed among sovereign states, and my method is to select specific political groups and institutions, to study their reactions to a new species of “federal” government, and to analyze the impact of that government in terms of the reactions caused. On the assumption that “integration” is a two-way process in which the central institutions affect and are affected by the subject groups, the Coal and Steel Community is to serve as a case study illustrating the effects on the totality of interactions.

The essential conclusions may be briefly summarized. The initiation of a deliberate scheme of political unification, to be accepted by the key groups that make up a pluralistic society, does not require absolute majority support, nor need it rest on identical aims on the part of all participants. The European Coal and Steel Community was initially accepted because it offered a multitude of different advantages to different groups. Acceptance of a federal scheme is facilitated if the participating state units are already fragmented ideologically and socially. Moreover, the acceptance of such a scheme is considerably eased if among the participating industrial, political, or labor groups there is a tradition, however vague, of mutual consultation and rudimentary value sharing. A helpful, but by no means indispensable, condition is the existence of an external threat, real or imagined.

Once established, the central institution will affect political integration meaningfully only if it is willing to follow policies giving rise to expectations and demands for more—or fewer—federal measures. In either case, the groups concerned will organize across national state boundaries in order to be able to influence policy. If the central institution, however, fails to assert itself in any way so as to cause strong positive or negative expectations, its impact on unity will be as small as the integrative role of such technically powerful international administrative unions as the Danube Commissions or the Universal Postal Union. As far as the industrial groups—business and labor—are concerned, they tend to unite beyond their former national confines in an effort to make common policy and obtain common benefits. Thus perhaps the chief finding is that group pressure will spill over into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integra-
tive impulse. Only industries convinced that they have nothing to gain from integration will hold out against such pressures. But industrial sectors initially opposed to integration for a variety of motives do change their attitude and develop strong positive expectations if they feel that certain common problems can be more easily met by a federal authority. More commonly still, groups are likely to turn to the federal authority for help in the solution of purely national problems if the local government proves uncooperative. Groups with strong initial positive expectations do not necessarily turn against the principle of integration if their hopes are disappointed: they merely intensify their efforts to obtain the desired advantages on the federal level, thus integrating themselves into organizations less and less dependent on and identified with the national state. Political parties, if allowance is made for their varying ideologies and constituencies, tend to fall into the same pattern. National governments, operating in the nexus of all these forces, may on occasion attempt to sidestep, ignore, or sabotage the decisions of the federal authority. The study of the Coal and Steel Community shows, however, that governments also recognize a point beyond which such evasions are unprofitable, and that in the long run they tend to defer to federal decisions, lest the example of their recalcitrance set a precedent for other governments.

After five years of activity, the pattern of supranational pressure and counter-pressure has become apparent: groups, parties, and governments have reassessed and reformulated their aims in such a way that the drive for a United Europe has become the battle cry of the Left. The “sinistration” of federalism has been accomplished in the recognition of trade unions and Socialist parties that their version of the welfare state and of peace can rationally be achieved only in a federated Western Europe. Perhaps the most salient conclusion we can draw from the community-building experiment is the fact that major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage. The “good Europeans” are not the main creators of the regional community that is growing up; the process of community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears profitable.

Our study thus substantiates the pluralistic thesis that a larger political community can be developed if the crucial expectations, ideologies, and behavior patterns of certain key groups can be successfully refocussed on a new set of central symbols and institutions. Yet this conclusion also begs the question of the generality of the process laid bare. Can larger political communities be created on this basis in all sections of the world, in all ages, irrespective of the specific powers initially given to the central authority? I suggest that the value of this case study is confined to the kind of setting which reproduces in essence the physical conditions, ideologies, class structure, group relations, and political traditions and institutions of contemporary Western Europe. In short, I maintain that these findings are sufficiently general in terms of the socio-political context to serve as propositions concerning the formation of political communities—provided we are dealing with (1) an industrialized economy deeply enmeshed in international trade and finance, (2) societies in which the masses are fully mobilized politically and tend to channel their aspirations through permanent interest groups and political parties, (3) societies in which these groups are habitually led by identifiable elites competing with one another for influence and in disagreement on many basic values, and (4) societies in which relations among these elites are governed by the traditions and assumptions of parliamentary (or presidential) democracy and constitutionalism. It may well be that the specific economic conditions under which the European coal and steel industries operate act as additional factors limiting the possibility of generalizing. Monopolistic competition and the prevalence of private ownership are such factors, though isolated pockets of nationalized industry exist in the total industrial complex. It may also be true that the impact of an overwhelmingly powerful external economic center acts as a limiting condition. Economic integration in Europe might have been much slower if the governments had been compelled to come to grips with investment, currency and trade questions—decisions which were in effect spared them by the direct and indirect role of United States economic policy. Hence, I would have little hesitation in applying the technique of analysis here used to the study of integration under NATO, the Scandinavian setting, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, or Canadian-United States relations. I would hesitate to claim validity for it in the study of regional political integration in Latin America, the Middle East, or South-East Asia.